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14 April 1965

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTRIES ON THE COUNTERINSURGENCY LIST

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE  
Office of Current Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
14 April 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Developments in Counterinsurgency

1. Congo

Government forces in the northeast continue to expand their control. The rapid advance through the northeast continues largely unopposed along the major roads and population centers. A force composed of mercenaries and Congolese soldiers last week end occupied Dungu and Niangara, 90 and 150 miles west of Faradje respectively, including their airfields. Other elements from Watsa have extended their patrols 50 miles to the southwest as far as Gombari, formerly a rebel headquarters.

Government forces operating out of Paulis on 10 April occupied the railroad terminus of Mungbere, a key north-south transportation center. They reported stiff rebel resistance on the road, and uncovered a mine field. This is the first determined rebel resistance other than in border areas in two weeks.

Government patrols from Niangara have headed north toward tribal centers at Doruma and Yakuluku near the Sudanese border. Preliminary reports from this area indicate only light rebel resistance. The antirebel Azande tribe which straddles the Congolese, Sudanese, and Central African Republic borders should help the government control this vast region.

Those rebels remaining in the northeast are isolated and disorganized. Moreover, food is sparse,

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and the rebels may soon be forced to attempt to enter towns. The only persistent rebel resistance has been encountered at a destroyed bridge between Aba and the Sudanese border. There are no indications as yet of a rebel counterattack anywhere in the northeast.

In the eastern Congo, the insurgent threat from Fizi continues. Army garrisons south of Fizi now are reportedly encircled, but still hold strategic locations on the major road running north from Katanga. Other government units retain control of the southern route from Bukavu to Kindu which serves important local mining centers. Uvira has been continually harassed since 2 April, but reinforcements are on their way to help extend the present defensive alignments.

The security situation continues to improve in other areas. Over the week end, another barge convoy reached Stanleyville without significant rebel harassment. Kwilu Province is reportedly calmer now than at any time since the outbreak of the original insurgency early last year. Pacification measures are now concentrating on supplying food and garrisoning towns.

## 2. Iraq

The Iraqi Army has apparently begun a new campaign against the Kurds in northern Iraq, but action thus far appears to consist of small-scale engagements designed to push the rebels back from the extended positions they occupied in the course of the 14-month cease-fire. Larger scale operations are likely to begin before the month is out.

The army has made extensive preparations for this campaign and believes its plans, which include systematic clear-and-hold operations, will prove more successful than did the campaigns of 1961, 1962, and 1963. There is no reason to believe that this will prove to be the case, however. Army morale is low and government forces still are not trained to cope with the Kurds' guerrilla tactics. As before, Kurdish mercenary forces operating with

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[redacted]

the army will probably bear a heavy share of the actual fighting. The government may attempt to seal the Iranian border in order to cut the flow of supplies to the rebels, but even a successful occupation of the border area--which is by no means certain--would not fully stop this flow.

The Kurds are still somewhat divided, although the bulk of the rebels continue to support Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Militant followers of the dissident Kurdish Democratic Party leaders Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani remain unreconciled to Mulla Mustafa's person and policies but most of them are interned in Iran; they are in any event a small group with little military potential. As the campaign drags on differences between Mulla Mustafa and certain Kurdish tribal leaders may become more acute. The rebels are for the most part refreshed, rearmed, and regrouped following the long 14-month cease-fire, but the present campaign is nonetheless the fourth in five years, and the Kurds--particularly the noncombatant women, children, and old persons--are probably growing increasingly tired of the inconclusive war.

The government's decision to resume the fighting was taken against the advice of Egyptian President Nasir and of his partisans within the Iraqi regime. Nasir not only advised against resumption of the war but apparently refused an Iraqi request to use the 600-700 Egyptian combat troops stationed in Iraq in the campaign. The Iraqi decision represents a significant defeat for the pro-Egyptian faction within the regime, and reportedly President Arif and Premier Tahir Yahya now feel confident enough to consider moving against them. A precipitate move against the pro-Egyptians, however, could raise tensions within the regime to dangerous levels and not only affect the course of the war but the stability of the regime itself.

### 3. Laos

[redacted] the Communists are making a major effort to keep

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open supply arteries in the panhandle. This effort included the rapid clearing of chokepoints near the Mu Gia Pass and farther south on Route 23, the apparent building of bypasses for bombed-out road sections, and the construction of new AAA sites protecting Mu Gia Pass.

This effort seems to be meeting with some success. Roadwatch teams have reported the continuation of significant numbers of southbound trucks on Route 23 despite the US air interdiction program. Although some of this traffic undoubtedly represents shuttle movement on the road, the large number of trucks involved (southbound average of ten per day since January) over an extended period of time suggests that there has been an input from North Vietnam, presumably through Mu Gia Pass. The identification of a 40-truck convoy moving through the pass on 10 April seems to confirm that the Communists are taking advantage of those periods in which Mu Gia is trafficable to send through large numbers of trucks.

North Vietnam appears to be engaging in aerial resupply of advance Communist positions in northeastern Laos. Aircraft, described as IL-14 transports, were spotted last week dropping supplies to Communist positions in the hills north of Ban Ban. Hanoi has 14 to 18 IL-14s.

These flights may reflect a one-time response to a particular tactical situation in the area where the Communists have been pressing to gain control over Route 6. They could also presage more systematic aerial resupply efforts by the Communists, however. US and Laotian air strikes at key transportation points, coupled with the impending rainy season, are likely to make overland resupply operations increasingly difficult.

The military situation remains quiet but there have been reports of a Communist build-up in an area along Route 9 from Dong Hene to Muong Phalane.

On the political front, preliminary tripartite talks are scheduled to open in Vientiane on 19 April. The reason for the Pathet Lao initiative pushing for negotiations is not clear but it may in part represent a genuine effort to effect a cease-fire in reaction to US and Laotian air strikes. The prospect for these talks is not bright, particularly since Prince Souvanna Phouma will be in Indonesia next week.

#### 4. Colombia

An official of centrally located Caldas State announced that 20 bandit gangs had been wiped out in this region in the past five years. The impact

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of the announcement, however, was diluted by a subsequent communiqué issued by the military authorities offering free instructions to the public in the art of self-defense against kidnapers. A grim reminder of the necessity for concern was the discovery this week of the body of Harold Eder, a wealthy former cabinet minister who was kidnaped on 20 March.

Vague but persistent reports of international Communist machinations in Colombia continued to appear in the local press and culminated on 12 April in a charge by the foreign minister that the country was the target of a plot "similar to that foiled in Venezuela last Saturday." Earlier press reports had asserted that one Ana Lucia Bacaranda had been expelled from Colombia for acting as an agent for the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). Her duties were said to have included service as liaison between FALN and the Colombian Army of National Liberation (ELN).

#### 5. Honduras

[redacted] the opposition Liberal Party has a large number of armed persons in the north coast area ready to undertake revolutionary activities against the Lopez government.

[redacted] Communist guerrilla bands are also active in several of the northern departments. Although these bands have not been reported active in recent weeks, the present political atmosphere lends itself to a step-up of antigovernment activities. The Honduran Government, however, is in no immediate danger from this threat since it continues to command the loyalty of the army.

#### 6. Venezuela

There are strong indications that the Venezuelan Government has exerted pressure on Italy to help roll up a Communist network that is financing the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) and

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its paramilitary arm, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). The Venezuelan interior minister at a press conference on 10 April asserted that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) is the channel through which a large sum of money was sent to the PCV. He was referring specifically to the 26 March arrest of three Italian "couriers" carrying \$330,000 for the Communists as a case in point. The minister implied that the smuggling attempt was somehow linked to the followers of Miguel Capriles, a leading newspaper publisher who is a bitterly outspoken opponent of the Leoni regime. More than 50 Caprilisters have been arrested in the past four days.

7. Chile

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there are 200 ERTE members in Santiago, and a few others scattered about the country. There are indications that the organization is affiliated with the pro-Communist Venezuelan Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) as well as with the Chinese Communists. One of ERTE's leaders is known to have spent six months in China in 1961-1962.

The orthodox Chilean Communist Party support of the Soviet advocacy of gaining power by peaceful methods has contributed to the growth of several Chinese-oriented activist factions such as ERTE. None of these, however, has thus far embarked upon a campaign of violence.

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